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Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines

(And Judges Be Judges)
Gerard E. Lynch*
In a prescient New York Times op-ed piece entitled "Let Guidelines be
Guidelines," written in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v.
Washington, before certiorari was granted in United States v. Booker, Bill Stuntz of
Harvard and Kate Stith Cabranes of Yale urged that the best solution for the
constitutional crisis facing the United States Sentencing Guidelines would be to treat
the Guidelines as guidelines, and not as a straightjacket. The Supreme Court
evidently took a similar view, deciding in Booker that the Guidelines were
constitutional only to the extent that they were not mandatory. The recent follow-up
decisions, Kimbrough and Gall, reinforce and extend the holding of Booker that
district court judges are not bound by the Guidelines, but should impose sentences
based on the general criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), after giving due
consideration to the Guidelines.
Before the cheering starts among district judges, let me renew the plea of
Professors Stuntz and Cabranes, only this time from the other direction. Just as
"sentencing guidelines" are misnamed when they are treated as narrowly rigid binding
rules, so are they misnamed when they cease to guide- anyone. In these quick
responses to the Supreme Court's recent decisions, I want to make two points. First,
as a matter of substantive sentencing policy, a system of carefully thought-out
guidelines that are subject to broad judicial discretion to depart, but accorded respect
by the courts and followed more often than not, is a highly desirable system for the
federal courts. Second, the existing system approximates such an ideal, but does so as
a result not of conscious policy, but of a strange and somewhat accidental confluence
of circumstances, in which a moderate and reasonable outcome has resulted from the
clash of extreme and ill-considered positions. That haphazard path has left some
residue that interferes with an ideally functioning system. Still, we are far better off
today than we were under the prior mandatory guidelines regime.
First, then, what do I mean by guidelines that are actually guidelines, and why do
I think that is a desirable system for the federal courts? Let us remember why we
have guidelines in the first place. The classic text here is Marvin Frankel's 1973 book
on sentencing, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order. The book repays regular
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rereading, because Marvin was a wonderful writer and rhetorician. If his eloquence
can be faulted for presenting an extreme picture of sentencing disparity under a fully
discretionary sentencing system, I believe his central case cannot easily be disputed. I
would distill two lessons from the experience of the pre-guidelines sentencing
universe: (1) to the extent that a system of total sentencing discretion for individual
judges permits each judge to adopt his or her own philosophy of sentencing, such a
system lacks democratic legitimacy and policy coherence; (2) such a system invites
excessive and unwarranted disparity, in the sense that offenders who are identical in
all meaningful respects may receive radically different sentences depending on
nothing more than the judge before whom they appear.
While these lessons should not be overstated, and may not require an extreme
response, I don't think they can be gainsaid. The criminal law is designed in large
part to control undesirable behavior, by a process of deterrence, rehabilitation and
incapacitation. It also seeks to teach values by imposing fair and proportionate
punishment on those who violate social rules. But these goals cannot be
accomplished if significant actors in law enforcement act at cross-purposes. To take a
simple example, it may or may not be a good idea to approach the problem of
intoxicating and addictive substances by criminal prohibition and severe punishments.
But we cannot have a coherent public policy on narcotics if half the sentencing judges
are fighting a "war on drugs" and the other half are pursuing non-punitive
rehabilitative treatment options. In a democracy, the legislature or its delegates
should decide which policy or combination of policies should be pursued, and judges
should follow the policy that is thus adopted. Similarly, the law cannot claim to be
fair and just when the same defendant may serve 15 years in prison or receive a short
stay in a treatment program depending on the policy preferences of the judge before
whom he happens to appear.
This insight does not require an end to all discretion. If the same defendant
should expect roughly the same treatment at the hands of different judges, different
defendants, whose circumstances meaningfully differ, should receive different
treatment. Any judge-indeed, any law enforcement official-knows that many
variations on criminal conduct, and many variations on individual character and
circumstances, bear on the fairness and policy value of incarcerating different
offenders, and that these variations are too great to be captured in a rigid numerical
scoring system. Discretion and judgment are called for to accommodate these
differences. Some disparity in sentencing, and some weakening of the overall policy
message, are the inevitable results of discretion: judges will inevitably see different
cases differently, and they will do so in part based on their policy judgments.
Whether I am persuaded to take a risk on an offender's case for mercy or claim that he
has changed his ways depends in part on whether he stands convicted of murder or
turnstile-jumping, and thus the persuasiveness of a plea of extenuating circumstances
is not easily divorced from a policy view with respect to whether, say, crack really is a
much worse drug than powder cocaine. But the price of such increased variation
seems to me worth paying to achieve individualized punishment, at least provided
judges do not use that discretion as a cover for pursuing idiosyncratic policy agendas.
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I suspect that a great deal of the disparity found by Frankel in the 1970s was not
the result of different judgments by judges about whether the case before them was an
aggravated or mitigated case, but by variations among judges in their general sense of
severity. Two judges may agree that a particular case is a substantially mitigated
instance, but that agreement will be hidden from view if one judge believes that
appropriate leniency means probation instead of the usual one year in prison, while
another thinks it consists of giving two years rather than the expected five. A
guidepost suggesting that two years is the usual sentence, which can be raised or
lowered depending on facts about the individual case, serves a useful function in
keeping everyone on the same page. And only if such guideposts exist, and are given
meaningful respect by judges, can society make the necessary collective decision as to
the degree of severity that will best accomplish society's goals.
Hence, guidelines are necessary. Not rigid chains, but not flaccid and ignored
exhortations either.
Second, how well does the current system approximate that ideal? Well, a lot
better than the mandatory system that preceded it. To understand the difference, one
may need to avoid an unnecessarily binary nomenclature. It is not clear to me that we
have gone from a "mandatory" to an "advisory" system. Rigid as they were, the
"mandatory" Guidelines were not, strictly speaking, "mandatory" at all. Statutory
mandatory minimum sentences are typically close to being truly mandatory,although
certain exceptions apply even to many of those. But for the most part, a statutory
mandatory minimum must be imposed where a defendant is convicted of an offense
that carries one. The guidelines were never mandatory in this strong sense, since
discretionary departures were permitted, and the Supreme Court in Koon seemed to
tell us that the departure standard was more flexible than many believed. Still, it was
fair at a minimum to call the guidelinespresumptive, in the sense that it was expected
that sentences would generally be within the guidelines range, and both the actual
message of appellate review of sentences and the atmosphere in which districtjudges
operated tended to define the departure power as limited both in quantity (departures
were expected to be a small minority of sentences) and quality (only either
specifically-approved categories of case or ones meeting a rather narrow test of
unforeseen circumstances qualified). Nor was it clear, at least before the recent
decisions in Gall and Kimbrough, that the new regime would leave the guidelines
merely hortatory. Booker left somewhat open the question of whether the guidelines
would function as weakly normative-i.e., as starting points that ought to be followed
absent some case-specific factor that constituted a decent reason for doing something
else-or merely as advisory in the sense of "free advice, worth what you paid for it."
Rather than a simple dichotomy of "absolutely binding and mandatory" versus "worth
thinking about, but merely advisory," there is a spectrum of weights that could be
given to guidelines, and the question after Booker was how far the Court intended
judges to move the system from somewhere close to truly mandatory towards the
other extreme of "not worth the paper they are printed on."
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While I celebrate the move away from one extreme, I hope that the Court has not
moved us too far towards the other. I think the answer will be found not in the words
of Supreme Court opinions, but in the collective practice of individual judges.
Although the Gall case sets the general standard, it may be Kimbrough-in
principle merely an application of the broader rule-that in practice tells us more
about the Court's intentions. Like almost all thoughtful practitioners and observers,
including the U.S. Sentencing Commission, I can find no rational justification for the
100-to-i crack to powder ratio. But as a sentencing judge, even after Booker, I have
struggled with the question of whether I am empowered to (and whether I should)
disregard that ratio in imposing sentence in crack cases. On the one hand, the
sentence dictated by the ratio will typically treat a minor drug dealer-a defendant
essentially indistinguishable from others receiving shorter sentences for other selling
quantities of other drugs of similar dollar value and destructive power-as the
equivalent of a major narcotics kingpin. That is not justice. On the other hand, if I
opt to disregard the guideline because it appears misguided, but other judges do not,
we have created exactly the situation I describe above as untenable: one in which
some crack defendants receive sentences dictated by a harshly punitive policy and
others do not, to the detriment of fairness and coherent policy. That is not justice
either.
Kimbrough appears to come down solidly in favor of the latter result. The
particular sentence in Kimbrough was apparently carefully thought out and based on
an individuated approach to the case at hand. The court of appeals may well have
been wrong to see it merely as an effort to impose a maverick independent policy on
crack cases, and the Supreme Court's opinion notes, at the end, the ways in which the
sentence was not simply a rejection of Congress's or the Commission's policy
judgments. Nevertheless, the opinion seems to go out of its way to approve a district
judge's power to give a non-guidelines sentence solely because of disagreement with
the policy that the guideline represents.
I'm not sure that this is a good idea, and I hope that judges will be sparing in
using such a power. There is reason to believe that they will be. I suspect that a large
number, perhaps a majority, of judges believe that the overall sentencing pattern of the
guidelines is excessively severe. At least, one could draw that conclusion from the
fact that downward departures/deviations from the guidelines have always
significantly outnumbered upward departures/deviations, although perhaps this pattern
simply means that the guidelines have been more thorough in identifying aggravating
circumstances than in recognizing mitigating ones. But I hope and expect that almost
no judges will react to Booker, Gall and Kimbrough by announcing that they simply
think the guidelines are too punitive and will generally disregard them in favor of a
much more lenient regime. Although as a citizen I would welcome a re-evaluation of
America's extremely punitive penal policy (which is unique in the Western world),
such a rethinking cannot be accomplished by a random pattern of leniency by some
unknown percentage of federal judges.
If judges avoid relying on a general policy disagreement with the guidelines'
approach to severity, it may be that the instances of specific policy disagreement (at
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least on any widespread basis) will be few. The crack guidelines, now somewhat
softened by the Commission in any event, are by far the most significant example of a
case in which the Guidelines' evaluation of an offense's severity relative to that of
other crimes is widely considered way out of kilter. There may, however, be a few
other examples.
My own approach to sentencing will continue to give the Guidelines meaningful
weight in sentencing, even where my own inclinations differ, and I hope that most of
my colleagues will do the same. After all, the Guidelines are, in and of themselves, a
factor that the law instructs me to consider. At a minimum, this must mean that there
are some cases in which the weight (however strong or slight) given to the Guidelines
will be the deciding factor. Moreover, the need to avoid undue disparity is another
factor to be weighed under § 3553(a), and disparity is more likely to be avoided, other
things being equal, if some significant value is placed on following the guidelines.
Finally, at least two of the substantive factors to be considered-the need for
deterrence and the need for punishment-are factors on which the Commission's
putative expertise and national perspective entitle its views to respect. The need for
punishment (that is, the retributive seriousness of an offense) is a highly subjective
factor, and one on which the social norm is more likely to be reflected by the
Commission's views than by my own private opinion. The need for deterrence is an
empirical matter, and while the Commission has not distinguished itself for empirical
research on this topic, it is better placed to evaluate the need than I, or any other
individual judge, can be. My comparative advantage, as a district judge, is in
evaluating those factors unique to each individual case that comes before me. But the
Commission's advantage is in weighing broad social policy, and responsiveness to
democratic political opinion. I should, I believe, give them deference as to the
appropriate starting point or typical sentence for the average or typical instance of a
given crime.
Did the Supreme Court get this balance right? While I'd be the last to invite
closer scrutiny by appellate courts of my sentencing judgments, and while I appreciate
the Supreme Court's vote of confidence in district judges, I think that appellate review
of reasonableness of sentences can play a valuable part in this process, and I suspect
that the Court, perhaps dismayed by the appellate courts' tendency to go beyond the
"abuse of discretion" standard for reviewing departures announced in Koon, may have
gone too far in emphasizing the limited role of appellate review. If an ideal
sentencing system tries to limit disparity to that which is the inevitable cost of a
reasonable method of discretion, appellate review of sentences that appear to go off
the reservation is an important component of that system. If we are going to let
(district) judges be judges, and trust them to exercise the necessary discretion with
sensitivity to the need for coherent sentencing policy, so we should let (appellate)
judges be judges as well, performing theirtraditional function of reining in excess and
gradually developing a "common law" of what is and is not sensible.
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Judging the efficacy of the post-Gall regime will not be easy. Oversimplified
analysis will be common, and it is well to be forewarned about some of it. First, the
number or percentage of non-Guideline sentences is not a fair or useful measure of
"disparity." To treat it as such is to assume the substantive perfection of the
Guidelines. Disparity means treating similarly situated persons differently, and not all
offenders who fall within the same guideline are in fact similarly situated. More
sophisticated studies of disparity, which carefully examine the individual facts of
particular cases, will be necessary to determine whether an increase in non-Guidelines
sentences reflects increased disparity, or simply the identification of relevant
differences-a question that calls for reasoned policy judgments and not merely
statistical analysis. Moreover, disparity also means treating different cases the same.
Absent truly demanding inquiry into particular cases, we cannot easily know whether
the rates of outside the guideline sentences are too high, or not high enough.
Second, we need to recognize that some disparity is the price of necessary
discretion. There are costs either way. We would have no "disparity," in the sense in
which the word is used by guideline fundamentalists, if every offender, regardless of
crime or character, received the same sentence. The federal Guidelines, of course, do
a far better job of discriminating cases than that. But whatever guidelines do not
capture-and the Guidelines capture almost nothing about individual character and
circumstances-must be the preserve of discretion. Eliminating discretion imposes a
price that is too often ignored when deploring the disparity that accompanies
meaningful discretion.
Third, we ought to be more sophisticated about the kinds of disparities that
inevitably exist in a federal system. Different regions and communities differ in their
needs and values, and I have never fully understood why Frankel' s arguments against
judge-to-judge disparity can be uncritically extended to district-to-district disparity. I
can't think of a rational defense of a system that encourages me to sentence based on
my policy preferences and the judge in the next courtroom to sentence based on her
directly opposite philosophy. But our federal system assumes that the criminal law,
which is for the most part left to the will of the several States, will be differently
enforced in Texas and in Vermont. It is no answer to say that the federal courts
represent a single sovereignty. That may well be so for matters of distinctly national
import. But for many federal crimes, federal law enforcement serves largely as a
backup to local priorities. Federal uniformity simply translates into unjustified
federal-state disparity if low-level drug dealers or firearms possessors or small-scale
grifters are sentenced in federal court in ways that are radically different from their
treatment in state courts. Such a system is especially unfair to the extent that
unfettered discretion in prosecutorial and police choices govern who will be subject to
which regime. A sensitive application of local values is not the same thing as an
individual judge's rejection of democratically-adopted public policy.
Determining whether trial judges are complying with such complex approaches
to individual cases, and making such subtle distinctions, is not a matter of simple bean
counting. It is also a question on which appellate courts, seeking to draw subtle
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distinctions between sensitive individuated sentencing judgments and simple policy
unorthodoxy, can have valuable input. As a matter of sentencing policy, it would
make sense to permit appellate courts to scrutinize sentences that represent departures
not simply from a Guideline sentence, but from any reasonable understanding of the
legislature's approach to sentencing policy.
Finally, let me say one word about the rather strange view of constitutional law
that has resulted in the downfall of the guidelines. From the standpoint of sentencing
policy, the federal courts are in a better place today than we were before Booker.
From the standpoint of constitutional law, however, we have arrived here by a very
strange route. I find it difficult to dispute Justice Alito's demolition of the premises of
Blakely and Booker. Certainly, from an originalist perspective, it is difficult to deny
that the framers anticipated that judges would, at least in some cases, exercise a
discretion that would inevitably be based on a broader view of the facts than those that
the jury found. Moreover, sentencing law suggests the limits of a simplistic textual
originalism-the Framers cannot have had any very specific or thoughtful
understanding of what the jury trial right meant with respect to judicial sentencing
discretion, because such discretion in cases of serious crime was rather a novelty at
the time they did their framing. Asking what the Framers would have thought of
sentencing guidelines is not very different from asking what they would have thought
of electronic surveillance: the relevant technology was simply not a part of their
world.
As a matter of constitutional law, I tend to agree with Justice Alito, and with the
basic position of the Blakely dissenters, that a reform that reduces the power of
individual judges to operate their own sentencing systems at the expense of the
legislature's power to set policy does not necessarily implicate the jury's fact-finding
powers any more than a discretionary sentencing system does. On the other hand, the
right to a jury trial clearly exists in some tension with legislative control of
sentencing. Like other forms of legislative control of substantive criminal law (see
the cases dealing with presumptions or affirmative defenses), legislative power to shift
critical moral elements from the definitions of offenses (where a jury must make the
finding beyond a reasonable doubt) to the sentencing phase (where they can be found
without a jury by a lesser standard) risks undermining the jury's role.
A stark constitutional jurisprudence that purports to leave no room for judicial
judgment must choose between absolute, and equally unpalatable, alternatives. Either
the legislature has total power to define "offense elements" and "sentencing factors"
(raising the specter of a crime of "offensive endangerment" that lets ajury decide only
that some minimal species of assault has occurred, with the judge to decide all
questions of the defendant's intent or the seriousness of the intrusion-in effect,
whether the defendant was guilty of reckless endangerment, rape, negligent homicide
or murder), or a jury trial is required on every fact that could possibly matter to a
reasonable sentencer (raising the specter of infinitely-complex jury trials, or of judges
disabled from considering at sentencing significant facts about a case that have never
been thought to differentiate different levels of crime or to be within the fact-finding
province of the jury ). Justice Scalia's apparent conclusion that any appellate review
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of sentencing potentially undermines the jury trial right, because the appellate
judgment would create (horror of horrors!) binding precedent that some sentences are
wrong for reasons other than that they exceed the legislative sentence for the facts
found by a jury is an example of such extremism. Although the majority in Gall and
Kimbrough do not endorse that view, I fear that their apparent skepticism about any
meaningful appellate review of the substantive reasonableness of sentences has been
influenced by it.
The only sensible resolution of the tension, it seems to me, is for the Supreme
Court to accept the constitutional responsibility to decide when the legislature, under
the guise of sentencing reform, has genuinely undermined the values that inhere in the
jury trial right. Telling those judges who (for whatever unusual reasons) didn't "get
it" that sentences should ordinarily be higher where a defendant exploited a vulnerable
victim-a policy on which most judges always acted in imposing discretionary
sentences-does not undermine the right to a jury trial because it leaves the judge to
decide whether the victim was vulnerable without a jury's help. Allowing appellate
review of reasonableness threatens neither the right to a jury trial nor the necessary
discretion of trial judges to individualize sentencing. Neither do sentencing guidelines
that provide some meaningful guidance and have some actual influence on sentences.
However, setting three different levels of punishment for drug dealers depending on
the nature and quantity of the drug, with different maximum and mandatory minimum
sentences, is not a mere matter of defining "sentencing factors," as some appellate
courts, misled by McMillan, held in the pre-Apprendi,pre-Booker world. Telling the
difference is a matter of judgment, based on a reasoned judicial understanding of the
role of the jury trial and a fair appreciation of American tradition, and there will be
cases on which reasonable judges will disagree, based in part on their individual
"philosophies." Moderate, conservative judges like Justices Stewart, Powell, and
O'Connor recognized that such line-drawing is a part of the constitutional judicial
role, and avoids the extremes of hyper-deference to the legislature on the one hand or
a literalism that prevents the legislature from adopting meaningful sentencing reform
without paying an impossible procedural price on the other.
As Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes wisely reminded us, proponents of a rigid
guideline system were afraid to let sentencing judges be judges; the Supreme Court
has perhaps transcended that fear. The Court still seems to fear letting appellate
judges perform their traditional function; I hope that restrained, judicious review of
sentences outside the mainstream will prove that this fear is also overstated. The
constitutional philosophy of a number of Justices professes a deep fear of any linedrawing by the Court itself. Perhaps we should not be afraid to let Supreme Court
justices be judges, too.

